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Abstract—The live migration of Virtual Machines (VMs) is a
key technology in server virtualization solutions used to deploy
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds. This process, on one
hand, increases the elasticity, fault tolerance, and maintainability
in the virtual environment. On the other hand, it increases the
security challenges in cloud environments, especially when the
migration is performed between different data centers. Secure
live migration mechanisms are required to keep the security
requirements of both cloud customers and providers satisfied.
These mechanisms are known to increase the migration downtime
of the VMs, which plays a significant role in the compliance to
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). This paper discusses the main
threats caused by live migration and the main approaches for
securing the migration. The requirements of a comprehensive
Quality of Service (QoS)-aware secure live migration solution that
keeps both security and QoS requirements satisfied are defined.
Keywords—virtual machine; live migration; secure migration;
quality of service; downtime; service level agreement;
I. INTRODUCTION
IaaS cloud environments provide elastic and demand-based
computing resources and save the cost of deploying permanent
servers with high capacities. For this reason, public and private
IaaS clouds are increasingly used by many sectors to provide
storage and computing capacity to the applications when
needed. Server virtualization is the underlying technology that
enables the cloud management systems to allocate VMs to the
organization applications in private clouds and to the customers
in public clouds. One of the key technologies in virtualization
is the live migration that transfers a running VM to another
host with as little service interruption as possible. Live mi-
gration supports the elasticity of the virtual environment and
allows the continuity of services under many situations such
as maintenance, faults, and attacks. It can also be utilized for
improving the operating costs by consolidation of resources,
or for load-balancing among the host systems. Unlike cold
migration, live migration of a VM has to handle both cold
state (e.g., the virtual hard disk, hardware configuration) and
hot state (e.g., CPU state, RAM contents).
One of the main challenges in cloud environments is
protecting the customer data from different threats imposed
by virtualization. This challenge is even more critical when
migration is used. The migrated data is often transferred
without encryption, thereby creating different threats for the
migrated VMs. The need for a secure live migration of VMs
is particularly critical when the migration between different
data centers over a Wide Area Network (WAN) is performed.
However, any secure migration mechanism will cause some
overhead on the migration process. The live migration is not
supposed to interrupt the running services on the VM for a
long time. It is, therefore, important to investigate the cost of
security in terms of the performance penalty experienced when
using a secure live migration mechanism.
Two main metrics are important to evaluate the efficiency
of live migration approaches. The first metric is the total time
required to perform the migration by the source and destination
hosts. The second metric is the time period in which the
services running in the VM are interrupted. This period is
known as the downtime of the VM. The maximum accepted
downtime of a VM mainly depends on the requirements of
the user and services running in the VM. These requirements
are defined in the SLAs between the cloud providers and
customers. It is very critical for the cloud provider to keep
the compliance to these SLAs when live migration is used,
and at the same time, keep the user data protected during the
migration. Non-compliance to SLAs will cause monetary and
reputational losses to the cloud provider.
The downtime depends on many factors such as the mem-
ory size of the VM, network bandwidth and load, load on
the host systems, and mainly the migration strategy used for
migrating the memory pages of the VM. Two main strategies
are the post-copy and the pre-copy migration. According to
[1], the post-copy migration first pauses the VM and transfers
its processor and devices state to the destination host, initially
ignoring RAM contents. The VM is then resumed at the
destination host. Whenever the VM tries to access missing
memory pages, it is temporarily paused and the missing pages
are requested from the source host. The VM is resumed once
the missing pages have been received. In contrast, the pre-
copy migration strategy includes 6 stages: the initialization, the
reservation of resources at the destination host, the iterative
pre-copy that first copies the entire RAM then iteratively
transfers modified pages, stopping the VM and copying the
modified pages after the last iteration, the confirmation by the
destination that it has a consistent copy of the memory, and
finally the activation of the VM on the destination host [2].
Several solutions for secure live migration were presented
but with little or no consideration of its cost and its effects on
the QoS provided by the VM. This paper focuses on a QoS-
aware secure migration solution that integrates the decision
making with the security measurements to keep both secure
migration requirements and QoS requirements satisfied. The
solution considers many factors before making the migration
decision such as the estimated downtime of the migrated VM
and the maximum allowed downtime according to the SLA.
This paper introduces the topic and defines the requirements
of such a solution. It also presents the main threats imposed by
migration and the main mechanisms used for secure migration,
as well as their influence on VM downtime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the main threats on both the migrated VM and the
cloud environment caused by live migration. It also discusses
the main mechanisms presented by researchers to handle these
threats. In Section 3, the correlation between the downtime
and the SLAs is discussed in addition to the possible cloud
provider losses imposed by SLA violation. The architecture
and requirements of a QoS-aware secure live migration solu-
tion are presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes an early
prototype of a testbed that is being prepared for evaluating the
solution. Section 6 concludes this paper.
II. SECURE LIVE MIGRATION
Secure live migration mainly aims to protect the VM from
third party attacks during the migration process. Two issues are
to be discussed here: potential threats during live migration,
and approaches for a secure live migration.
A. Threats
Two main categories of threats are faced with live migra-
tion: the abuse of the migration process itself, and attacks
on the benign VMs during migration. An example of the
first category is compromising the management system and
creating undesired migrations, leading to a denial of service
attack on the VMs and the involved hosts. Another example is
migrating a malicious VM from a malicious host to a benign
host to perform VM-escape or side-channel attacks against
the host and other VMs respectively. In the second category,
the migrated VMs might be susceptible to many attacks
such as man-in-the-middle, denial-of-service, and stack over-
flow attacks [3]. The migrated data such as kernel memory,
application state, sensitive data such as passwords and keys
etc., are usually transmitted without encryption. The data then
can be sniffed or tampered easily during the migration, thus
compromising integrity and confidentiality of the VM data [3].
These attacks can be either active attacks that manipulate the
migrated data or passive attacks that eavesdrop on sensitive
data such as passwords [4]. The most critical active attack is
hijacking a benign VM (that is migrated from a benign host)
by a malicious host. These threats are of particular concern
if migration is performed between servers of different widely
distributed data centers [5]. This discussion helps to define the
main requirements of a secure live migration. First of all, the
source and destination hosts should be trusted to avoid the
migration of a malicious VM to a benign host or hijacking the
VM. The second important issue is to ensure authorized access
to the management interface to prevent malicious users from
initiating undesired migrations. The third and the most critical
issue is the integrity and confidentiality of the migrated data.
B. Solutions
Many researchers addressed the issue of secure live mi-
gration by defining the security requirements of the VMs, and
proposing solutions and protocols that utilize existing security
technologies to satisfy these requirements. Some researchers
also evaluated the resulting downtime of the secure migra-
tion [6]. However, current research in the secure migration
domain has not yet considered the QoS requirements of the
VM and how to satisfy them during the migration. In gen-
eral, many secure channel, trust establishment, and encryption
mechanisms are used in these solutions. For example, the
authors in [5], perform live migration over an IPsec (IP
security) implemented transmission channel. This mechanism
has a large overhead on the total migration time and the
network traffic. The authors tried to decrease this overhead by
adjusting the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) and Max-
imum Segment Size (MSS). IPsec and its protocols provide
encryption, authentication and authorization while keeping the
transmitted data integrity intact. The authors in [7] proposed
a framework for a secure VM migration. The framework is
based on hypervisors included in the Network Security Engines
(NSE). It enables the traditional security approaches (such as
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and intrusion prevention
systems) included in NSEs to work in the context of live
migration. The framework transfers the security context along
with migration data so that the VM can be restored at the
destination.
The authors in [4] define a complete framework for secure
live migration in which many mechanisms for satisfying the
requirements of a secure live migration are used. The trust
in the migration source and destination is ensured using
hardware-based platform integrity verification using a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM). The authorities of the administrator
are ensured by defining role-based access control policies
using the SUDO tool. The integrity and confidentiality of the
migrated data are ensured using an SSH secure channel. Other
security measures such as the firewalls and intrusion detection
systems are deployed in the hosts.
TPM is widely used by researchers for secure migration.
The authors in [8] also used TPM capabilities to design a trust
credential for establishing trust with the migration destination
platform. The authors in [9] also proposed a TPM-based trust
protocol for migrating VMs between federated cloud providers.
Other researchers used isolation for secure live migration.
For example, the authors in [10] used an isolated migra-
tion network in which the source and destination hosts are
grouped into a Virtual LAN (VLAN). Table I summarizes the
mentioned solutions and which secure migration requirements
(discussed in Section II-A) are considered by each solution.
III. VM DOWNTIME AND SLAS
Although live migration strategies are designed to have a
small downtime, they still lead to a short service unavailability
[11]. The downtime imposes significant economic aspects
that need to be considered when live migration of VMs is
used: service interruptions and unavailabilities lead to reduced
business productivity and therefore to financial losses. In the
worst case, service unavailability for a certain period of time
might induce the loss of revenue since the customer’s trust in
TABLE I. SECURE LIVE MIGRATION REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERED BY PRESENTED SOLUTIONS
Secure migration approach Trust Management authorities Integrity and confidentiality
Bin Sulaiman et al. [5] Yes Yes Yes
Xianqin et al. [7] No No Yes
Anala et al. [4] Yes Yes Yes
Aslam et al. [8] Yes No No
Celesti et al. [9] Yes No No
Anwar [10] Yes No Yes
the service might be lost and he might not rely on the service
provider in the future and switch to competitors instead. This
will directly lead to a financial loss for the service provider.
Moreover, reputation impact of a large downtime and regu-
latory compliances plays an important role. Nowadays, news
about frequent or particularly long downtimes of a service are
spread quickly and widely. In this case, the probability of long-
term damage to an organization’s reputation is higher than ever
before and will lead to the loss of (prospective) customers.
Furthermore, stringent government regulations require orga-
nizations to safeguard the reliability, privacy, and availability
of customer data. Non-compliance with these regulations can
lead to heavy financial penalties. In addition to governmental
supervision, SLAs are part of most organization’s contracts
with customers or business partners. SLAs promise some level
of service availability [11], leading to penalties if conditions
are not fulfilled. If the service interruption during downtime
exceeds the time determined in the SLAs so that the agreed-
on level of service is not met, the firm could have financial
penalties. According to the this argumentation, we assume
that the monetary loss from downtime is calculated from the
sum: ”loss due to reduced business and productivity” + ”loss
due to losing customers” + ”loss due to missing prospective
customers” + ”loss due to non-compliance of governmental
and contractual requirements”.
When live migration of VMs is used, the downtime needs
to be minimized and financial consequences of the unavoidable
downtime are imperative to be considered. Therefore it is
essential to predict the worst case downtime as precisely as
possible [11]. In the academic literature, the financial effects
of downtime during live migration have not been sufficiently
covered. Some researcher, however, studied the methods that
might be used to estimate the downtime. The authors in [13]
conducted a survey that summarizes the current approaches
for evaluating the performance costs of VMs live migration.
In [11], a model is presented that predicts the downtime based
on a few characteristic parameters and is tested experimentally
for applicability. The experiments in [14] have shown that
live migration causes a longer than expected downtime, which
results in a violation of SLAs.
IV. SOLUTION ARCHITECTURE
The security and QoS requirements imposed by live mi-
gration must be reflected by a comprehensive decision making
process that considers all relevant environment parameters,
user policies, and SLAs. The security parameters such as the
threat level of the migration path, and security policies defined
by the VM owner or the cloud service provider will be used to
determine the required security measures during the migration.
The performance parameters such as the network bandwidth
and memory size of the VM will be used to estimate the
migration cost. This cost will then be compared to the residual
allowed cost determined by the SLA and downtime history
of the VM. The migration is only allowed if the estimated
cost does not violate the SLA. To achieve these goals, a
central decision making module will interrupt any migration
request issued in the cloud management system. This module
will read the environment parameters, user policies, and SLAs
to determine the required security mechanisms, estimate the
migration cost, and finally make the correct decision. The
decision making process is not yet integrated in any live
migration or secure live migration solution neither in the
academic literature nor in the commercial or open-source
systems.
In this section, QSLM, a comprehensive solution for a
QoS-aware secure live migration is described. Figure 1 de-
picts the proposed architecture. The central component of the
solution is the QSLM algorithm that receives the migration
request from the cloud management system and makes the
appropriate decision. The implementation of this approach
will develop add-ons for open source cloud solutions such as
Proxmox [15] and Openstack [16] to intercept all migration
actions. The decision of the algorithm is then translated to
a set of actions and events that are communicated to the
cloud management system and the cloud hosts. These actions
include allowing or prohibiting the migration, and using certain
security mechanisms if the migration is possible. The decision
is taken according to the following inputs from the cloud
management system:
• The security mechanisms deployed in the cloud hosts,
also including an estimated overhead if possible. This
information must be provided by the cloud adminis-
trators.
• The full topology of the cloud environment including
the network links and bandwidth.
• The security metrics of the entities in the cloud
environment. The simplest form of these metrics is
the security of a communication link over which the
migration will take place. For example, a wireless
link might be considered to have low security. This
information must also be provided by the cloud ad-
ministrators.
• The security policies for each VM and cloud host.
For example, a cloud customer might require all
migrations of his VMs to be performed over secure
channels. These policies are created by both the cloud
system administrators and customers.
• The downtime budget for each VM. This value is
determined from the SLA and the downtime history
of the VM.
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Fig. 1. QoS-aware Secure Live Migration (QSLM) Framework
In order to make the correct decision according to these
inputs, the QSLM algorithm requires a module that estimates
the maximum expected downtime of a VM depending on
certain factors. The main factors are: the migration strategy,
the size of the VM, the overhead of the security mechanism
(e.g. encryption algorithm overhead), the network capacity and
load, and the load in the source, destination, and the VM itself.
Some researchers addressed the estimation of the total
migration time and downtime for different migration strategies
(without considering the security mechanisms). For example,
the authors in [12] defined a formula for estimating the down-
time of the pre-copy migration strategy. The downtime of the
VM includes only the last three stages. The main factor here
is the number of the memory pages that are modified after the
last copy iteration. This number depends on the activity of the
VMs. In the worst case, all pages could be modified because
of a heavy activity. The maximum downtime in this case
is: ( VMSizeLinkSpeed + ConfirmationT ime + ActivationT ime),
where ConfirmationT ime is the time required for the desti-
nation to confirm that it has a consistent copy of the memory,
and ActivationT ime is the time required for the activation of
the VM on the destination.
In QSLM, the downtime mathematical model will also in-
clude the overhead of the used security mechanisms. Since the
encryption algorithm overhead is the main factor that increases
the downtime, a mathematical model will be developed to
estimate the expected execution time of different algorithms
for a given CPU speed. The data overhead of the encryption
algorithm will be also estimated and added to the VM size.
V. EVALUATION PLATFORM
The most important evaluation objective for the proposed
solution is to measure the migration cost (mainly the down-
time) caused by the live migration decisions made by QSLM
and to compare this cost with the cost estimated by the solution
according to the used security mechanisms and environment
parameters. This section describes a simple testbed for evaluat-
ing the downtime of a VM that is migrated over a SSH channel
in a WAN. The host system is a Debian-based Proxmox
virtual environment. The testbed uses a Gigabit Ethernet and
is configured as shown in Figure 2. A Proxmox router serves
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as WAN simulator and can add a certain delay. The VM has
a memory size of 512 MB and shared storage is used for
migration. Before the migration, a tunnel is created between a
virtual bridge on the target host and a virtual bridge on source
host. When the VM is migrated to Host B, it is connected to
a SSH bridge as shown in Figure 3.
VM downtime is measured by running a program inside
the VM that continuously sends packets to a client system.
By measuring packet inter-arrival times the downtime of the
VM can be estimated. Figure 4 shows the packets received at
the client from the VM when migration is performed while the
VM is in an idle state and without adding a delay in the router.
The packets received before, during, and after the migration
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Fig. 4. Received packets at the client
are depicted with the packet inter-arrival times. The inter-
arrival times indicate that the maximum downtimes during the
migration is 342 milliseconds. The figure also shows a total
migration time of about 7 seconds and larger inter-arrival times
during the migration due to the load on the network. The future
evaluation of the implemented solution will consider other
security measures, realistic loads and memory sizes, delays
in the migration path.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current approaches of secure live migration only
address security requirements with limited performance cost
measurements. Cloud service providers cannot easily adopt
these solutions since the performance loss might violate the
SLAs, especially for sensitive services. The downtime of a
VM that is migrated over a secure channel is not trivial
in realistic scenarios. Measuring this time even within large
environments is not enough to provide full control of the
process since the downtime is a dynamic factor that depends on
the current situation of the VM and possibly the environment.
These facts lead to the need for a comprehensive framework
that can make the correct decision according to the many
environment factors. A main requirement of this framework
is a downtime estimation approach. Future work will focus
on several directions: The solution will be implemented and
evaluated. Different security mechanisms will be integrated
and the overhead of these mechanism will be estimated. The
measurement of the downtime will then be extended to realistic
scenarios, possibly using cloud simulation solutions.
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